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INTRODUCTION 
Political Islam is today perhaps the most maligned feature of how we have come to 
view the religion of Islam as we encounter it. From what we perceive as the 
„powerless‟, „silenced‟ and veiled women of the Middle East and Afghanistan, to the 
global threat of Jihadi terrorism, from Iran‟s nuclear ambitions to the corrupt 
autocracies of the oil-wealthy Gulf states; these luminescent ciphers have 
highlighted to us the dangers posed by political Islam. In the public domain, media 
and to a slightly lesser extent, even amongst academic circles, political Islam is the 
most obvious symptom of Islam and the broader Muslim world‟s inability to deal 
with modernity, secularise and advance along the continuum of the Weberian ideal-
type society. 
 
Many countries, as varied as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, claim to be Islamic states in 
the world today. The image of a robed, turbaned cleric, best epitomised by the 
solemn face of the Ayatollah Ruhullah Mousavi Khomeini conjures up the mental 
image of the modern Islamic state. Just as Ernesto „Che‟ Guevara  –framed in that 
almost surreal photograph captured by Alberto Korda on the morning following the 
failed „Bay of Pigs‟ invasion– the image of Khomeini is a totemic symbol to many 
people who feel they are oppressed. These images for others however point to the 
dangers of populism, violent or rhetorical struggle and most importantly, the two 
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When the Ayatollah Khomeini‟s theory of the Wilayat-e Faqih, the „Guardianship of 
the Jurisconsult‟, was approved by the Constitution of the newly revolutionised 
Islamic Republic of Iran and acknowledged with the official title of Supreme Leader 
or Wali-e Faqih; it marked the evolution of over a century of modern Islamic 
political thought. The history of modern Islamic political thought did not begin with 
the 19
th
 century Islamic ideologue Sayyid Jamal-ad-Din Afghani, nor did it end with 
Khomeini. But it is generally the majority opinion that a modern political discourse 
emerged with Afghani‟s writings (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5). 
 
As for Khomeini, never in the modern history of political Islam had the theoretical 
so effectively been transformed into the empirical. For the first time, the actual 
theories of an ideologue became the official ruling mantra of an entire state, an entire 
nation, perhaps for some in the western world, an entire religion. In Saudi Arabia 
and other Muslim countries, the thoughts of clerics and classic or modernist Islamic 
discourse did indeed guide some of the workings of the state such as the judiciary. 
But in no other country was the prime institutional mechanism of the state defined so 
completely by one man and his theories. 
 
The institutionalising of the Wilayat not only marked the first time that this 
happened, it also represented the apogee of modern political Islamic thought. The 
history of modern Islamic political thought cannot be separated from the emergence 
and crystallisation of the modern nation-state. In reality, the ideologues that will be 
studied in this paper all reacted to the idea of the „state‟, and their writings are 
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There have been extremely thorough historical analyses of modern political Islam 
(Enayat 1982), while others have outlined political Islam and its relation to the 
broader Islamic modernist discourse (Tayob 2009). Others have tried to grapple with 
the failure of political Islam (Roy 1994). The Islamic state has also been historically 
analysed by Feldman (2008) but the basis of this analysis was legal and historical, 
highlighting the link and tension between rulers of the Islamic state, the clerical 
establishment and the mediating influence of the interpretation of the body of 
Islamic law (the Shariah).  
 
But very few have attempted to use Political Science as an analytical tool in 
analysing this history and perhaps the most central variable in the enunciation of 
modern political Islamic thought: the state. The novelty then of this study lies in 
analysing and tracing the evolution of the idea of the state, from the works of Jamal-
ad-Din Afghani, to those of the Ayatollah Khomeini. 
 
This paper is almost entirely theoretical, and unashamedly so. The argument of this 
paper, that the state has transformed in the discourse would not have been thorough 
enough, nor analytically balanced in depth and space if the paper focused at great 
length on a single empirical study. Starting with the research question, „how has the 
state come to be theorised in modern political Islamic thought?‟ this paper proposes 
that the Islamic state reacted to its external environment as well as the legacies and 
theories of preceding generations of Muslim political ideologues. 
 
The state in modern Islamic political discourse can be periodised into three distinct 











Page | 4 
an instrument to revive Islam for Afghani. The second age represented the 
intermediate phase and followed the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The final 
phase marked the period that coincided with the failure and corruption of post-
colonial states. 
 
For the earlier theorists, the state was seen as the classic Hobbesian, Weberian and 
Machiavellian state that focused on the state‟s role to rule by maintaining order with 
a bureaucracy in place to run this territory. The state was an „instrument‟ to effect 
change for a Muslim polity and to sustain control. A major transformation of the 
state then begun to emerge in the 20
th
 century, eventually culminating in the state 
becoming more „normativised‟, if such a word can be used. The basis of this is the 
analytical conception of the state as a „normative order‟ as conceptualised by Geertz 
(1980) and Krasner (1984). Within this conception, the state was no more an 
intervener, instrument or a means to an end in politics. It now became the end in 
itself. 
 
The state was no longer a loosely conceptualised body that should be utilised to 
revive Islam as it was in the works of Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, but now it 
became the very embodiment of Islam. Islam could not be lived in society and life 
without the Islamic State serving a totalising realm that incorporated and collapsed 
the religious, political and social. But even in the later conceptions, this paper argues 
that the instrumentalist role of the state did not entirely dissipate. In fact these 
theorists were forced to resort to instrumentalism in small ways because the history 
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However the instrumentalism transformed from being the instrumentalism of 
Afghani where the state was at the service of reviving Islam, to the instrumentalism 
of Rida where the state could help establish a real society of justice, and finally the 
qualified instrumentalism of Mawdudi and Khomeini where the state was subject to 
God‟s ownership of its domain and thus „God‟s sovereignty‟. The Islamic state 
became increasingly theorised as an obligation of religion, whereas for the earlier 
theorists it was a means at religions disposal. Its structure or form was not 
conceptualised as unique at its earliest enunciations and there was very little if any 
compulsion to establish a certain form of government, whether this be republican, 
constitutional or monarchic. 
 
The paper‟s utility lay in not simply writing-off the Islamic state as a failure of Islam 
to deal with modernity and separating religion and state as other studies have done. 
But its usefulness lay in highlighting the way the state has transformed and the 
repercussions of this for Political Scientists in the comparative field. Simply writing 
something off does little in trying to gain a clearer understanding of the state in 
political Islam. Identifying the culmination of the Wilayat-e Faqih as the zenith of 
the evolution of Islamic political thought, helps to highlight and periodise the 
epochal shift in the course of Islamic modernism. As colonialism and corruption 
weighed down Muslims, the trajectory of political Islam veered into investing the 
state with Divinity and thus unconstrained power. This is what we can refer to as its 
„normativisation‟. 
 
In terms of structure, this essay will first conceptualise the most important themes 
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Science conception of the state as instrumentalist against the state as normative 
order. The third section will focus on the pioneering work on modern political Islam 
and its focus on revivalism. The fourth section will focus on the intermediate phase, 
where modern political thought had reached a crossroad. The fifth and final section 
will focus on fundamentalism, and the increasing focus on a totalising Islamic 
normative order, whilst being sensitive to the tension that lay between the 
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1. CONCEPTUALISATION 
 
1.1 Textual Sources of Islamic Law & Jurisprudence 
The textual source of codifying law or presenting a theological argument in Islam 





 centuries. The first and most substantial is the Qur‟an which 
is viewed as the literal word of God. If a canon is explicitly mentioned within the 
Qur‟an, it is viewed as an inviolable commandment (Enayat 1982, 105). The second 
textual source is the science of hadith which are the traditions of the Prophet 
Muhammad. These rely on the sunnah (ways) of his daily life. His companions 
memorised and passed on his sayings and habits through oral history, and this was 
collated as written history a century or two later (Feldman, 16 March 2008). 
 
Those who specialised in this science of collecting and writing these traditions 
(Muhadithun) paid careful attention to the chain of narration and characters of the 
transmitters and categorised these traditions accordingly, from the very strong to the 
very weak. Yet because we are speaking of humans who by nature are wont to 
exaggeration and political and other expediencies, some Muslim modernists have 
doubted the veracity of many of the Prophetic traditions. If something is not found in 
the Qur‟an, the hadith is the most authoritative text in this regard (Enayat 1982, 
148).  
 
When new issues arose that were unexplained or ambiguous in both the Qur‟an and 











Page | 8 
consensus (Ijma) of the most senior jurists and this corresponds somewhat to judicial 
precedent in western common law. Jurists would generally, though not always 
follow the majority view (Feldman, 16 March 2008). The final source is the 
application of analogical reasoning (Qiyas) which purposively applies logic to 
understanding and comparing how the substantive issue at stake may produce a new 
ruling that is still consistent with the substantive teachings of the Qur‟an and hadith 
(Enayat 1982, 148). 
 
1.2 The Shariah 
The Shariah is a contested term that has come to imply much in the contemporary 
world. Although conceived by many as interchangeable with Islamic law, this is very 
much a modern reading (Feldman, 16 March 2008). Literally meaning „the path‟, the 
Shariah at its core refers to the „totality‟ of God‟s will revealed to the Prophet, which 
encompasses the explicit injunctions of the Qur‟an and Prophetic traditions (Mir-
Hosseini 2007, 2) such as the prohibition of murder. 
 
Islamic Law as it came to be constructed is in fact called Fiqh (jurisprudence) and is 
the applied textual jurisprudence of the classical jurists from the four sources of 
Islamic texts. With reference to its application in the articulation of the Islamic state, 
we shall see later that the distinction that existed between the two eventually 
collapsed so that Fiqh became interchangeable with the Shariah as Divine 
injunction. Some Muslim modernists have decried the blurring of this distinction 
because they view the Shariah as irreproachable and Divine to Muslims. On the 
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human endeavour, and thus something that is imperfect. Jurisprudence for them must 
be contextualised amidst the backdrop of the context of primordial power relations 
(Mir-Hosseini 2007, 2-4).  
 
For Mir-Hosseini (2007, 2-11) the new system of social organisation that the state 
has brought has in effect politicised Fiqh. Whereas in the past the scope for applying 
Fiqh institutionally was curtailed, the modern state apparatus has granted wide-
ranging power. This is because it has become instituted and the social and human 
science of Fiqh is now portrayed as the Divine law of Shariah. For the early jurists 
there was a distinction between „ritual‟ rulings which they admittedly conceded were 
limited in scope for change and rational application, and „social/contractual acts‟ 
which were contextual and thus evolutionary. Thus, rulings of Fiqh which are 
„social/contractual acts‟ must necessarily be open for re-evaluation (Mir-Hosseini 
2007, 3-4). 
 
But this collapsing if not expressly approved of, is nonetheless of less importance to 
many Muslims today. This is because the core of the divine injunctions and the 
Shariah as a hope to institute a better society go beyond mere sets of laws, but 
represents a chance to live Islam in its entirety and regenerate the political landscape 
of their fledgling countries. The Shariah for many Muslims today “connotes a 
connection to the divine, a set of unchanging beliefs and principles that order life in 
accordance with God‟s will (Feldman, 16 March 2008). 
 
The Shariah is best thought of as a „higher law‟ which although to some may 
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to social life and desire for justice. For some Muslims such as the Wahabi and Salafi 
groupings in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, the Shariah incorporates both the Qur‟an 
and hadith as both are connections to the Divine. This is because the Qur‟an was 
God‟s literal word, and the way of life of the Prophet was divinely guided. These 
groups typically criticise blind following of the classical jurists especially in regard 
to citing consensus or independent analogy as canon, the third and fourth source of 
jurisprudence. They argue rather that independent juristic ability should be granted 
to modern scholars and even the layman, if something is not present in the Qur‟an or 
the hadith (Piscatori 1989, 61-2). 
 
 
1.3 Sunni Islam and Shi’a Islam  
Shi‟ism and political Islam are almost inextricable from each other. The very 
establishment of the Shi‟a sect occurred after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 
632 A.D. and was politically motivated. It had to do with the issue of succession of 
the Muslim empire. Upon the Prophet‟s death, his best friend and father-in-law Abu 
Bakr was chosen as his successor by a council of the closest confidants to the 
deceased Prophet. Ali, the Prophet‟s first cousin and son-in-law, is purported to not 
have been present when this council came to its decision (Rahnema and Nomani 
1990, 19-20). 
 
After Abu Bakr two more Caliphs, Umar and Usman, were chosen as successors 
until the reign of Ali. For Sunni‟s all three successors as well as Ali, are equally 
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claim to any divine characteristics. They are thought of as those that are mentioned 
in the hadith as successors that are Rashidun because of their virtue and perhaps the 
exaggerated belief that their reigns were unconstrained by corruption and deviation.  
However, Shiites believe that the three Caliphs in between effectively usurped power 
because the Prophet had declared Ali his successor whilst on his return journey to 
Medina en-route from his last pilgrimage to Mecca (Rahnema and Nomani 1990, 
19). Sunni scholars dispute this claim of the Shi‟a as fabrication (Abd al-Raziq 2000, 
99-100). 
 
Despite being one of the richest men in Mecca at the time of conversion, Abu Bakr 
for his worth was unswervingly loyal to the Prophet. Ali for his part did pledge his 
political fealty (bay’a) to Abu Bakr. It was Abu Bakr who is reported to have uttered 
the guidance and consolatory words to the confused Muslim community upon the 
Prophet‟s death, which have now become immortalised (Heikal 1981, 76): 
Whosoever amongst you worshipped Muhammad, then know that Muhammad is dead. And 
whosoever (amongst you) worshipped God; then know that God is Alive, He shall never die. 
 
Aside from the polemics that go with the debate, the „Twelver‟ (Ithna Asharia) sect 
of Shiites which most Iranians are, form the majority of worldwide Shi‟is. They are 
largely based in Iraq and Iran, and Khomeini and perhaps Afghani were also 
„Twelvers‟ (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5). They believe that the hereditary line of the 
Prophet‟s family were the rightful successors to the Islamic empire, both as temporal 
political leaders, as well as spiritual leaders of the entire Muslim communities. Ali 
was the first in a line of Twelve Imams from this hereditary line which is called the 
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These Imams, for Shiites, are accorded the same status as all the Prophets (including 
Jesus and Moses) and are infallible. The twelfth of these Imams disappeared into an 
underground chamber in Hilla in 873 A.D and never returned. Twelver Shiites 
believe that he is in occultation and will reappear to bring victory to them and moral 
justice to the world, hence the designation „Twelvers‟ (Rahnema and Nomani 1990, 
20). While there are myriad other Shiite sects, not to mention Sunni sects, and while 
differences in beliefs can range far further than this explanation presupposes, this 
basic cursory explanation in the context of this paper shall suffice. Although figures 
are disputed, Shiites today make up roughly between 8 and 15% of the total Muslim 
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2. The State in Political Science 
 
The state as envisaged by Political Scientists and philosophers, from Aristotle to the 
behavioural revolution, has undergone immense theoretical and empirical changes. 
Muslim scholars such as Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) have also 
contributed to the political philosophy body we have at our disposal today. 
Irrespective of the different methods in analysing the state, the concept of the „state‟ 
is premised on theoretical similarities, despite the differing empirical methods 
(Barkey and Parikh 1991, 525). 
 
But despite all of this, conventional social sciences have classically looked at the 
state as one of rule and control, even in the most behavioural and pluralist of 
explanations. As a guide to viewing the state in modern Islamic thought, this paper 
will make a simple distinction between two broad ways the state has been treated. To 
simplify our analysis, it ignores the internal divisions within the vast body of western 
social science and picks up on the distinction made by Geertz (1980). 
 
 
   
2.1 The Conventional View on the State versus the State as Normative Order 
The conventional view on the state is largely Machiavellian, Hobbesian and 
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state needed arms to defend itself and laws to run its society. Without establishing 
control a state could not carry out its implementation of law and order: 
The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good 
arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that 
where they are well armed they have good laws (Machiavelli 1992, 12). 
 
From Weber state discourse inherited what Geertz (1980, 133) calls “Weber‟s „iron 
cage‟”. This cage is a teleological explanation, which culminates in states 
establishing dominion over its territory and instituting a bureaucratic administration 
to administer affairs of the state, through a legal order. This continuum was in the 
image of the trajectory of western states. A bureaucratic administration for Weber “is 
capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency, and is in this sense formally the 
most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings” while the 
state is a “human community that [successfully] claims the monopoly of legitimate 
use of physical force (emphasis mine) within a given territory...the state is a relation 
of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate...violence 
(Weber 1958, 78).”  
 
The state‟s main function is dominion and establishing largely identifiable borders; 
instituting a political and administrative apparatus in place to run this territory and 
an acknowledgement by others that it is indeed a sovereign entity (Williams, 
Goldstein and Shafritz 1994, 4). Even in the most pluralist explanations where the 
state is seen as a complex platform wherein is aggregated the competing interests of 
groups in society, interest groups and civil society; the state is still seen as 
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Likewise the state is also an instrument, though in a different way, to the other end 
of the spectrum which sees the state as instrumentalist in ensuring that society does 
not descend into anarchy through its institution of government and a social contract 
that mediates its relationships to society; which in turn provides peace and prevents 
anarchy (Hobbes 1975). 
     
The „state as normative order‟ has been given taxonomical currency by Krasner 
(1984) as one way the state has been analysed in Comparative Politics.  The state as 
normative order is based on Clifford Geertz now immortalised study Negara: the 
Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (1980), although Geertz himself does not 
refer to his approach as such. For Geertz (1980, 121), the state in political discourse 
has three etymological themes compacted within it:  
status in the sense of station, standing, rank, condition–estate (“The glories of our Blood and 
state”); pomp, in the sense of splendo[u]r, display, dignity, presence–stateliness (“In pomp ride 
forth; for pomp becomes the great/And Majesty derives a grace from state”); and governance in 
the sense of regnancy, regime, dominion, mastery–statecraft (“It may pass for a maxim in state 
that the administration cannot be placed in too few a hands, nor the legislature in too many”). 
 
For Geertz, reliant on rule and control, the last definition of state, statecraft; the 
latest and most modern, has come to dominate the analysis of the state since 
Machiavelli in the 16
th
 century. This definition has all but completely obscured 
and extirpated the other two etymological themes and the “multiplex nature of 
high authority (Geertz 1980, 121).” But when it comes to the symbolic 
dimension of why people do what they do, western political thought has been 
incapable of providing any conception beside the basic command-and-
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Political symbology is simply an aspect that is dependent on the real business of 
politics: social domination and political monopoly of violence that is the state‟s 
true function. These analyses although claiming to be different approaches to 
the state in actuality all accentuate the mechanics of society and completely 
ignore the poetics of that society (Geertz 1980, 122-3). But in the Negaras 
(states) of Bali, Geertz‟s case study, status was not simply the oppression of a 
ruling class, but it entirely represented life. Status, caste and station were not 
simply feudal relations, but to every Balinese it was the very definition of life. 
It was the “axis around which the public life of society revolved (Geertz 1980, 
123).” 
 
The status of an individual represented that person‟s relation and distance from 
Divinity. Theoretically this status was life‟s given and not a contingency of 
social class. Status translated into actual emotions and compulsions that come 
with it and mediate all the acts that were political. The Balinese Negara “drew 
its force, which was real enough, from its imaginative energies, its...capacity to 
make inequality enchant (Geertz 1980, 123).” 
 
The state did not rely on force or exploitation to intervene as an instrument and 
structure status groups and subservience, but it was the very embodiment of 
how a reality of political acts and life was arranged. In doing this, it was a 
representation of life itself and the “model-and-copy conception of order”, 
rather than order based on control. This model-and-copy order was that held by 
the king. To construct a state in Bali, you had to construct a great king of pomp 
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And this king who was indistinguishable from the state in a united realm 
represented what power was, and in his court ceremonies, dramatic plays, court 
titles and eulogies; represented the entirety of the political and social life:  
The more consummate the king, the more exemplary the centre. The more exemplary the 
centre, the more actual the realm (Geertz 1980, 124). 
 
The hierarchy of statehood and its kings “were not defenders of the faith, Vicars 
of god, or Mandatories of Heaven, they were the thing itself-incarnations of the 
Holy as such...The rajas, maharajas, radadirajas, devarajas, and so on were so 
many hierophanies, sacred objects, that...displayed the divine direct (Geertz 
1980, 124).” Those that connected the sacred to the populace were the priests 
who were the emblematic executers of divineness. Priests were “parts of the 
king‟s regalia...„the foremost of the king‟s jewels‟...the hilt of the king‟s 
kris...learned in religious law, adept in ritual...wondrously virtuous...not simply 
a royal adornment, a symbol of royal authority, but rather an embodiment of 
part of that authority, and extension of the king‟s official person (Geertz 1980, 
126).” 
 
The priest was the guide to the populace with his relationship to the king 
demonstrating the ideal relationship. This relationship exemplifies the perfect 
relation between ruler and subject and was the example to the populace of how 
to serve one‟s God (Geertz 1980, 127). God owned the realm and the state was 
the religious design reflected in the hierarchies within a „sacred space‟. This 
hierarchy of exemplars reflected the nature of life and relationship to the God. 
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for the realm to make sense. Each lower one was a coarser version of the caste 
above and was not in the Marxist analysis less real, but rather just less exquisite 
and less potent (Geertz 1980, 128-31). 
 
All those that resided in the realm and benefitted from its blessings and energies 
were collectively responsible for meeting the ritual and moral obligations that 
this entailed. The political community was not separate from the realm “and at 
base was not a social, political or economic unit, but a religious one (Geertz 
1980, 129).” The king who sat at the apex had to project an enormous calm, 
whether in court ceremony or in perception, at the centre of the state and realm. 
But he was also significantly a “political actor, power among powers as well as 
sign among signs (Geertz 1980, 131).” 
 
Standard political theory has come to define the political as the sphere of social 
action, about mastery and control. This is not erroneous, but it glosses over 
other factors because of its own trajectory of historical interpretation. 19
th
 
Century Bali on the other hand provides a discrete conception of what “politics 
is about and what power comes to. A structure of action, now bloody, now 
ceremonious, the Negara was also, and as such a structure of thought. To 
describe it is to describe a constellation of ideas (Geertz 1980, 135).” 
 
The western social sciences argues Geertz (1980, 135), despite “its topical and 
practical modernity” is actually deficient in reality because it cannot explain the 
power of ideas, symbols and what these evoke, represent and signify, and how 
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analysed, so too can rituals, palaces, technologies, and social formations 
(Geertz 1980, 135). 
 
The mechanical aspects such as village politics and the spiritual ones such as 
myth and ceremony were entirely part of the political in the realm of the state. 
Geertz (1980, 135-6) decries the tendency of interpretative analysis to relegate 
the symbolic to „cultural‟ analyses which in turn is based on western prejudice. 
Cultural analyses treat their case studies as fetishes and completely miss the 
point. This downgrades the „symbolic‟ to the dichotomous opposite of the „real‟ 
as is the dichotomies of the “fanciful to [the] sober, figurative to literal, obscure 
to plain, aesthetic to practical, mystical to mundane, and decorative to 
substantial (Geertz 1980, 136).” 
 
Geertz‟s conception of the state as normative order are not simply relevant to 
Bali in the 19
th
 century, but it directs us to the facet of the state that is present in 
all states, only less apparent because of „Weber‟s iron cage‟ in modern politics 
(Krasner 1984, 233, Geertz 1980, 133). The realm of the state was of ultimate 
unity and people did not obey simply because of the threat of force and 
monopoly of violence that the state possessed, but they obeyed because there 
was no alternate reality and their lives was a reflection of all contained in  the 
„princely realm‟ of the state. 
 
The controlling ideal and norm is the adhesive on which the actual state rests on. In 
this way shared realities, symbols and beliefs, not the threat of force or the power or 
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212-5). The rules that bound society were not obeyed out of any rational choice but 
because the laws "stand for the fact that a common, thus, moral life exists, and they 
celebrate the common life and make it compelling (Eckstein 1982, 472).” 
 
The symbols that were entirely internalised in the workings of the state 
“embodied” and represented the “basic political and ethical sentiments that 
permeate[d] the polity”. This was “a fundamental institutional constraint that 
channels the behavio[u]r of individuals even to the point of endangering or 
sacrificing their lives (Krasner 1984, 233).” The encompassing sphere of the 
state sustains the ethical and moral needs of citizens through its „normative 
order‟, such that alien conquest or ascendancy implies “a loss for all citizens 
because it means the destruction or severe weakening of the individual's social 
and moral community (Krasner 1984, 233).” 
 
This is in stark contrast to the Weberian ideal-type state which has come to 
dominate standard political thought and its analyses. These analyses largely 
equate the state with governance or statecraft, rule and control. The ceremonial 
role of the state has traditionally been viewed as a device or „instrument‟ to 
legitimate the ruling system or foster nationalistic spirit, not as an end in itself. 
 
For others such as Marx, ceremony and symbolism were false ideologies used 
to bolster the power base of the ruling class. This analysis has conversely been 
carried down to all political spectrums today in how they may view religious 
ideology and symbolism in Islamic lands. Yet as this paper will show, the 
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far from primarily a tool to gain more power, but rather rested on the ambition 
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MODERN ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT 
The Islamic state is not entirely a modern concept even if the modern-conception of 
the Westphalian state is novel in its implementation in Muslim lands. This is most 
obviously because the Prophet Muhammad was not only viewed as the apostle of 
God to the Muslims, but also the leader of the Muslim populace in the city-state of 
Medina, which would grow into the expanding Muslim empire. The idea of the 
Westphalian state in Islam emerged in a modern discourse that begun to emerge in 
the 19
th
 centuries when the leading modernist Islamic ideologues begun to articulate 
the role of Islam and the Muslim in a state. 
 
These discourses emerged in the colonial, pre-independence and immediate post-
independence periods amidst the backdrop of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 
subsequent failure of many post-independence Muslim states. Consequently these 
discourses reflected the concerns of the times, such as trying to revive Islam, resist 
colonialism, emulate the success of the west; or the reinstitution of the state-less 
Empire of the Caliphate. This new discourse was essentially modern in both its 
outlook and aim. Modern in aim because it dealt with the issue of a nation-state and 
modern in outlook because it naturally reflected the impact of western advancement 
in the most important fields that underpinned this, including the social sciences. 
 
Yet at the same time, these discourses did not purport to be new paradigms even if 
they were in most cases entirely novel forms of analyses. As its very name would 
suggest, the Islamic state theorised the search for a modern state or nation-state with 
reference to Islam, mainly guided by its principles, largely justified by its texts and 
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reverse some (at times major) dogmatic beliefs. Thus, to its main protagonists, the 
discourse was more a revisionist look at the role of Islam in the state, even if its 
application to the modern nation-state was entirely a novel form of analysis. 
 
One of the earliest of theorists of a modern political Islam was a Persian most 
famously known as Jamal ad-din „al-Afghani‟. 82 years after Afghani‟s passing, an 
Islamic Republic was established after a popular revolution in the ancient land of 
Persia which was most likely Afghani‟s homeland, changing the future of the young 
nation-state of Iran forever. Sunni pre-modern reformers and thinkers were indeed 
present in many parts of the Muslim world and their major impetus was naturally 
sensitive to the new ascendancy of the west. Thus their works could be termed 
„revivalist‟ and were premised on the need for reform-oriented reflective thought and 
possible action. Amongst them were the Istanbul thinkers of the Ottoman Empire 
such as Ahmet Cevdet Pasa (1822-1895) (Chambers 1973) and the North African 
Khair-ud-din Al-Tunisi who as his suffixed last name would suggest, was Tunisian 
(Tayob 2009, 27, Brown 1974, Kramer 1997, 76). 
 
However, there is a general consensus that while there may have been other and 
earlier influences, the true pioneering works on a Sunni political Islam begun with 
the works of the Persian journeyman Sayyid Jamal-ud-din „Al-Afghani‟ (1839-1897) 
and the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) (Beinin and Stork 1997, 
5). Both were based in Cairo, and the fact that of the most significant modern 
Muslim political thinkers, only the final two analysed in this paper, Khomeini and 
Mawdudi were neither Egyptian nationals nor at least lived there at any period, is 
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and the two most pivotal thinkers and figures in the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan 
Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb were also Egyptian. 
 
Hanson (2006, 104-5) asserts that there is agreement among scholars, from Marsden 
to Hourani, Huband to Lawrence, that the modern Islamist thought that emerged in 
the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century Egypt, was the most pivotal “to the global 
development of political Islam.” The most important catalyst for this that swayed 
Arab and Muslim opinion in general and Egyptian opinion in particular, began when 
Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798. It was in the face of having to deal with such 
flagrant western imperialism which ran concurrently with Islam‟s own fall, that the 
earliest political thinkers emerged (Hanson 2006, 104). Naturally, theirs was a 
discourse of revivalism. 
 
Because this paper enjoys the luxury of being a comparative study, with due respect 
to the legacies of Abduh and his fellow Egyptians Al-Banna (1906-1949) and Qutb 
(1906-1966) their works have been omitted. This is because this dissertation wanted 
to highlight major paradigmatic shifts in viewing the state in Islam. Afghani was 
chosen over Abduh because he was more of the mentor, and many of their theories 
treat aspects in a similar way. For example, while Afghani argued that power is the 
marker of a religion‟s truth (Al-Makhzumi and Al-Afghani 2003, 134-6), Abduh 
similarly viewed Islam‟s main duty as acquiring more power (Tayob 2009, 59). 
 
The broader approach to the Islamic state for both Abduh and Afghani were similar 
in conception. Tayob (2009, 17) asserts that for both Abduh and Afghani, “[r]eligion 
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less to do with placing any normative underpinnings of an Islamic state. Thus they 
were both concerned with the instrumentalist capability of the state. As for Qutb and 
Al-Banna, their contributions were highly contextual within the landscape of 
Egyptian politics, the founding of the Ikhwaanal-Muslimoun (Muslim Brotherhood) 
in 1928 and the battle against Arab nationalism and the different Egyptian authorities 
(Tamadonfar 2002, 146-50). Their works highlighted the increasing rise of 
fundamentalism and the state as an Islamic normative order. This shift in the Islamic 
state literature was more articulately elaborated by Mawdudi and Khomeini. 
 
 




Afghani‟s origins, up to this day remain shrouded in controversy and obscurity. He 
was known as Sayyid Jamal-ud-din „Al-Afghani‟ in the Sunni Muslim and larger 
world, but according to Shiite and Iranian history, Afghani was actually from 
Asadabad in Persia proper and is thus known as Sayyid Muhammad Husayni 
Asadabad in the Shiite world (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5). The birthplace suffixed 
title of „Al-Afghani‟ suggests that he was Afghan, and it is very likely that this was a 
clever ruse to make him more acceptable to his large Sunni fan-base, since Afghans 
were majority Sunni (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5). In fact Afghani was most likely a 
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Afghani was first and foremost a political revivalist who was radical in his approach 
at the time. In India he was exposed to modern ideas and he soon began calling for 
complete freedom from colonialism. His creative approach attracted large followings 
in the Muslim world where he highlighted the “dynamic and progressive nature of 
Islam (Tayob 2009, 50).” Well travelled and liked, he was exiled to Paris from Egypt 
by the British in 1882 with his protégé and contemporary Muhammad Abduh. Here 
the two published a Pan-Islamic journal entitled Al-Urwa al Wuthqa (The Firmest 
Link) (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5). 
 
He also very much moved around in high circles, debating the French public 
intellectual Ernest Renan (1823-1892), whilst often meeting the rulers of Egypt, Iran 
and the Ottoman Empire. He would advise the latter group to remain autonomous 
from British colonial interference and also to be more accountable to their populace 
(Tayob 2009, 50-4). Tayob (2009, 50) places Afghanis‟ works as those more 
befitting of a public intellectual with scattered ideas in leaflets and orations, rather 
than a scholar with a coherent body of religious thought. Much like his fellow 
Persian Khomeini years later, Afghani interlaced his discourse with religious 
symbolism and validations. 
 
He was quite aware of the power of rhetoric and its capacity for mobilisation: “his 
main role was...to use Islam as an ideology” which could “strengthen its position as 
a focus of identity and solidarity against the attacks of the Christian west”, which 
was a useful “rallying point for the repulsion of western conquerors (Keddie 1983, 
96).” For Afghani, religion is mostly relevant in its political dimension, thereby 
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outlook, Afghani felt that religion was “supplied” to man to ameliorate their 
“treacherous, greedy, bloodthirsty” nature (Keddie 1983, 140).” 
 
The foremost utility of these inherited beliefs were almost entirely political. Religion 
provided the bases of stabilising society and holding it together to ensure that men 
did not degenerate into bestiality. Man, says Afghani, has acquired from religion: 
a firm pillar for the existence of nations and the permanence of social order; a stable foundation for the 
civilisation and progress of peoples and tribes; and an active agent for the repulsion of the evil and 
corruption that are the cause of the dissipation of people (Keddie 1983, 141). 
 
Thus as his very starting-point in describing the utility of the state, Afghani 
highlights its relation to religion as a basis for civilisation and development; and the 
checks this provides against repelling evil and corruption. For Afghani, “unity of 
language of which nationality and national unity consist” and religion are the two 
most extensive bonds in the human world (Keddie 1983, 17). However, the „nation‟ 
and national unity which was the product of the unity of language was much more 
important than religion as it is more “durable” and thus has “more influence than 
religious ties in most affairs of the world (Keddie 1983, 17).” 
 
Thus the fundamental basis of the state and the nation for Afghani was more 
important than religion. Religion provided the basis for civilisation through 
providing norms but the nation was the „instrument‟ for civilisation to be achieved. 
This overweighting of religion‟s utility as a political function is taken even further. 
Government for him was like the typical Political Science amalgamated view on the 
state as the Machiavellian ideal of rule and control and the Weberian model of 
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borders, dispense justice by applying a moral and legal code, collect tax and 
dispense social works (Keddie 1983, 146). 
 
While religion is placed at the centre of his analysis, Afghani places religion‟s 
primary goal as building a stable polity and therefore not related to spirituality or 
duty. For him, “the truth of religion was less important than its value (Tayob 2009, 
56).” The social and political challenges that modernity posed to Islam, was more 
significant than the value system of Islam. 
 
Unlike his successors, Afghani thought that there is a fundamental truth 
underscoring all religions. A particular spiritual set of beliefs was not the marker of 
truth, but rather the society that possessed the most power was the truest: 
[R]eligions in their collectivity are the whole...Whosoever from these religions is on the truth 
then such will attain dominance and triumph, because the promised authority belongs to the faith 
of truth as we said, and not the faith of the Jews, the Christians and Islam, if they remain simply 
names (Al-Makhzumi and Al-Afghani 2003, 134-6). 
 
The thrust in contemporary times for political hegemony and power as a marker of 
achieving the will of God, whether this is the quest for nuclear weapons or the 
arming of Jihadi militias, may very well have been an inadvertent consequence of 
Afghani‟s equating power with truth. His linking of political emasculation with 
straying from the truth is somewhat similar to how Islamists like bin Laden point to 
Islam‟s impotence as indicative of the erosion of Islamic values and the corruption 
entailed in the „western‟ fashioned lives of its rulers and societies. Unlike modern 
Islamists, Afghani does not claim a monopoly on the truth for Islam, Afghani  
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as well as their „claim‟ to truth. Thus, what Afghani is suggesting is that “„even if it 
be false‟, religion was still useful (Tayob 2009, 56)”. 
 
A prime difference between Afghani and the ideologues who took up the mantle in 
the 20
th
 century such as Khomeini is that the form of government was not a religious 
necessity. The state for Afghani was indeed essential, but as an instrument, so that 
man does not degenerate into bestiality. However, he did not limit the possibility of 
governance to any one form or theocracy as Mawdoodi and Khomeini would do 
later. No doubt reflecting his natural elitist tendencies, Afghani emphasised 
however, that this government could only be realised, whether constitutional or 
monarchic, only through a group naturally “endowed with qualities of guardianship 
(Keddie 1983, 146).” Government should protect sovereignty and borders, dispense 
justice by applying a moral and legal code, collect tax and dispense social works. 
 
From this, we are exposed to the fact that for Afghani there is no one form of 
prescribed Islamic government, whilst he also simultaneously suggests that some 
people are naturally endowed with qualities of guardianship. Afghani continues:  
Government also (emphasis mine) requires a group that knows the revealed law and the civil laws 
and arrangements of governments and peoples, and sits on the chair of decision and judgment in 
order to decide legal and criminal disputes and settle enmities (Keddie 1983, 146). 
 
Khomeini‟s theory of the rule of the jurist is also perhaps premised on a similar 
argument as Afghani‟s. But a more careful perusal of this excerpt actually shows that 
what Afghani means in this statement is that the religiously learned such as jurists, 
are primarily needed for the civil and administrative functions of government. It is 
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follows this up by saying that government also requires the religiously learned, more 
as judges and arbiters over legal cases than as leaders. Thus the clerics in the state 
are necessarily separated and distinct from the political leaders of the state. 
 
Tayob (2009) has termed Afghani‟s approach to religion „functionalist‟. And it is 
this point that lends more credence to the objective of this study to place the state as 
the centre of analysis and utilise general Political Science theory in analysing 
modern political Islamic discourse.  While Afghani‟s approach is indeed 
functionalist from a Religious Studies or Sociological perspective, insofar as it 
corresponds to the basic premise of Sociological Durkheimian functionalism by 
highlighting functional imperatives in order to maintain stability within a populace; 
in terms of Political Science, this would be a misnomer. 
 
This is because functionalism in Political Science is part of the broad church of 
behaviouralism and pluralism which sees everything as atomistic and state power as 
constantly eroding at the expense of regional integration, International Non-
governmental organisations (INGOs), unregulated cross border informal trade and 
consensus based civil society-government interaction (Rosamond 2000, 50-5). 
Within this conceptualisation, the state is more a benign variable of „low politics‟ 
than an instrumentalist one of „high politics‟ such as order, control and power. 
 
So what exactly is the conception of the state for Afghani? In analysing these 
thoughts, it is clear that the state was needed to ameliorate man‟s “treacherous, 
greedy, bloodthirsty” nature. The intervention of religion was left to the state which 
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Afghani equating the “existence of nations” with a “permanence of social order” 
which in turn would be a “stable foundation...for civilisation and progress (Keddie 
1983, 141).” The state was the instrument whose active agent was religion, but the 
state‟s own duty was not religious. It was rather entirely political because it had to 
establish order (Machiavelli/Hobbes) and provide somewhat of a rational leadership 
that resembles a bureaucracy (Weber). This would prevent anarchy and be a platform 
to seek advancement.  
 
For Afghani the symbolism of Islam as a legal code which could bring about a true 
basis of justice was less important than the institutional basis this could bring about 
in solidifying a state. The foremost utility of the inherited beliefs of religion were 
almost entirely political. The state had no metaphysical value, just a rational one: to 
institute order and promote advancement. Religion‟s primary goal was to build a 
stable polity and therefore not related to spirituality or duty. The social and political 
challenges that modernity posed to Islam, was more significant than the value 
system of Islam and the state must be used as an instrument to revive Islam as a 
polity, rather than as a religion. 
 
Religion‟s utility could be instituted by the state because religion was “a firm pillar 
for the existence of nations and the permanence of social order; a stable foundation 
for the civilisation and progress of peoples and tribes; and an active agent for the 
repulsion of the evil and corruption that are the cause of the dissipation of people 
(Keddie 1983, 141).” Religion provided the basis for civilisation through providing 
norms but the nation was the „instrument‟ for civilisation to be achieved. Religion 
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This is because he felt that the nation and the state were more “durable” than religion 
as a uniting element of a people (Keddie 1983, 17). 
 
His idea of the state was entirely premised on the typical amalgamated Political 
Science view wherein the Machiavellian state had to ensure rule and control through 
monopolising violence within its domain, and the Weberian model of a bureaucratic 
administration to administer the affairs of the land. That is why the state for him 
should protect sovereignty and borders, dispense justice by applying a moral and 
legal code, collect tax and dispense social works (Keddie 1983, 146). 
 
Yet, as part of the broader picture, the emphasis on building a state capable of 
maintaining order and more especially some sort of modern polity that could 
culminate into establishing a resurgent Islamic „civilisation‟ was also influenced by 
the need to deal with modernity in a similar way as western Europe. The emphasis 
on power as a marker of truth was no doubt influenced by a realist view on politics 
and a natural reaction to the decline of Islamic power. The inherent argument that 
could be made is that Afghani viewed the truth of religion as contingent on the 
Machiavellian and proto-realist view of power as the most definitive interest in 
contemporary times. 
 
The emphasis on providing an instrumentalist approach reflected the revivalist 
ambitions for Islam as well as the potential of religion and its norms to provide some 
form of order, rather than as any existential value or truth. This is reflected 
somewhat in the implied focus on probity and rationalisation of the political process 
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reflected the age of colonialism and the new ascendancy of the west and the 
simultaneous political and material decline of Islam. 
 
Unlike the Islamists that would follow him, Afghani does not claim a monopoly on 
the truth for Islam, nor even prescribes any particular form of government as 
obligatory or „Islamic‟. The state‟s functionality, in his words, could be realised 
under any “form of government, whether republican, constitutional or absolute 
(Keddie 1983, 145-6).” All that was required was the correct people who are 
“naturally endowed with qualities of guardianship (Keddie 1983, 146)”. This 
corresponds to a rational bureaucracy that Weber articulated in the running of a state 
(Weber 1958, Chilcote 1981). 
 
On the other hand Afghani also does not discount a king or monarchy from 
achieving the stability and advancement that a state can afford. This is also similar to 
Weber‟s definition of a traditional authority whose legitimacy rests on rules handed 
down and authority resting with a chief (Chilcote 1981, 112-3). The role of Islamic 
Law and clerical interpretation is not all-encompassing but merely administrative. 
They do not impact on the executive or legislative function of government because 
for Afghani their role was limited to arbitration within the judicial function of the 
state through “decision[s] and judgment[s] in order to decide legal and criminal 
disputes and settle enmities (Keddie 1983, 146).” 
 
This early period of an instrumentalist Islamic state in discourse was reliant on 
religion insofar as it provided laws and bases for establishing society. While religion 
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a religious imperative with a particular form sanctioned as part of the obligatory 
code of life for a Muslim. Religion provided rational choices and institutional 
constraints such as a belief system that ensured that men did not resort to anarchy 
through its provision of a civil and judicial legal-code. The state was not a Divine 
requirement so much as a facilitator for achieving „civilisation‟ and advancement; 
and the possible harbinger for an Islamic revival. 
 
While these instrumentalist emphases did not entirely dissipate in the later theories 
of the Islamic state, its significance was overtaken in later years by the complete re-
conceptualisation of what a Muslim or Islamic state should be. Indeed as this paper 
will later reveal when analysing Khomeini and Mawdudi, institutional roles and 
justifications were part of the broad need to establish the Islamic State. The major 
difference however was that the state would become the embodiment of Islam in 
much the same way as ritual obligations such as refraining from carrion or praying 
the five prayers. 
 
Perhaps to simplify what this paper is arguing it may be more useful to view the 
political writings of Afghani as that of the administration of a Muslim state. On 
the other hand, the later works such as Khomeini‟s and Mawdudi‟s are not simply 
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3.2 The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire 
One of the watershed moments in the history of Islamic political discourse was the 
fall of the Ottoman Empire. Tayob (2009: 103) highlights this episode as one of the 
most significant in the theory of the Islamic State. When the Ottomans were defeated 
in World War I, its end was nigh and the imminent political vacuum was naturally a 
ripe forum for religious thought to weigh in on the debate. The establishment of the 
Ottoman Empire in 1299, until its disbandment in 1924 in Turkey, marked the final 
phase before the arrival of the nation-state in Islamic lands. Straddling multiple 
landmasses across three continents, the Ottoman Empire was at its peak the most 
powerful empire on earth. Within its territories, the Ottomans would rule over 
Muslim Turks, Kurds and Arabs, Christian Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks and Armenians, 
as well as significant populations of Jews, gypsies and other peoples (Shaw 1997, 
vii). 
 
The Ottoman territories served as a conduit for the routes and flow of trade and ideas 
between the Orient and the Occident both literally and figuratively. This affirmation 
is no better summed up by the fact that the viaduct city of Constantinople, later 
renamed Istanbul, bridges the Bosporus, the narrowest shipping strait on earth that so 
symbolically connects the European part of Turkey, Thrace, with the Asian side, 
Anatolia. Thus, Istanbul remains the only metropolis that spans two continents 
(Shaw 1997). 
 
The Ottoman Empire comprised over 30 provinces, vassal territories and mini-states, 
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whilst maintain large degrees of autonomy. Discontent and unhappiness with being 
ruled by Turks and Turanians began to emerge in the 19
th
 century with the 
emergence of Arab nationalism, and was reflected in the works of Abduh and other 
Arab nationalists. Even Christian Arabs envisaged a future quasi-Caliphate, presided 
over by Arabs to regain pan-Arab sway at the expense of the Turks (Enayat 1982, 
56-7).  
 
The Ottoman sultans were seldom referred to as Khalifas (Caliphs) when they 
assumed political hegemony of the majority of Islamic lands upon the death of the 
Abbasid caliph Muttawakil in the 16
th
 century. The reasons for this were two. Firstly, 
Hanafi
1
 jurists who were the preferred and protected Sunni school of thought of the 
Ottomans regarded the Caliphate as holding currency and existing only under the 
first four caliphs, the Khulafa-e-Rashidun (the rightly guided Caliphs) (Enayat 1982, 
52). 
 
The second reason was the juristic majority Sunni view that descent from the 
Prophet‟s own tribe of Quraysh was de rigueur for acknowledgement of the title of 
Caliph. The leaders of the Ottomans were initially called Sultans until the 18
th
 
century when the title Caliph was used as an additional provision in an agreement 
with the Russians. The politicking uses of the term „sovereign Caliph of the 
Mohametan (sic) religion” gave the sultan more power over other Muslims in the 
steppes and Transcaucasia (Enayat 1982, 52-3).  
                                                             
1
 The Hanafi School of law is the earliest one of the four major schools of thought in Sunni Islam, the 
other being the Shafi, Maaliki and Hanbali Schoools. It gets its name from its primary super jurist 
Numan ibn Thabit Abu Hanifa, a Persian who lived in Kufa, Iraq. These schools of thought are schools 
of jurisprudence which codify laws and cover most aspects of the law including rituals, transactions 
and punishments. The Hanafi School is followed in majority in the Indian subcontinent and Turkey, 
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It may have been more appropriate to refer to the Ottoman administrative apparatus 
as a Sultanate, but once the title Caliph was conferred, some traditionalists supported 
its legitimation and this gathered momentum with the necessity of maintaining unity 
later in the face of European expansion, discontent in the provinces and Arab 
nationalism (Enayat 1982, 52-53). When the Caliphate was abolished by the Grand 
National Assembly of the Turkish Republic in 1924, the history of Sunni Muslim 
political thought and more broadly greater Islamic political thought, reached its most 
defining moment. The current of Islamic modernist political thought that had 
emerged in the 19
th 
century had lost much of its thrust by this time, but its zeitgeist 
had reached its zenith and Enayat (1982, 52) contends that the debate between 
modernists and traditionalists for a while promised some sort of uneasy truce or even 
a synthesis in discourse. 
 
But with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the Caliphate 
which followed it a few years later the response to Turkey‟s decision to secularise 
resulted in a more acute polemic-laden schism within the debate. From this scenario 
and confrontation “the Muslim mind” inexorably meandered “in the direction of an 
alternative to the Caliphate” becoming “one of the factors stimulating the call for an 
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4. The Intermediate Phase- Political Islam at a Crossroad 
Whereas, the articulations of the Islamic state in its primacy were led mostly by 
members of the educated elite and politically conservative middle classes with some 
affinity for the west, the tide began to change at two distinct periods. The first was 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the second was the period after World War II. 
The latter reached its zenith in the 1970s as most post-colonial Islamic states either 
suffered from terminal instability or were mired in monarchic corruption. 
 
This paper argues that this first phase immediately following the fall of the Ottomans 
can be termed the intermediate phase between the instrumentalist Islamic state of 
Afghani and Abduh, and the state as an Islamic normative order, which shall be 
elaborated on in the next chapter, of Mawdudi and Khomeini. This intermediate 
phase reflected both the revivalist ambitions of its pioneers, as well as laid the 




The fall of the Ottoman Empire brought with it not only a novelty for modern 
Islamic thinkers in that they were no longer under a quasi-Muslim empire, but also 
the boundless possibilities of instituting a new kind of polity. The earliest statements 
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especially in the Indian subcontinent, were still pressing for some form of 
maintaining it (Enayat 1982, 56-7). 
 
The Turkish parliament in a report outlined in religious and rational terms, the 
logistical difficulties in fortifying and maintaining a bulwark supra-state formation 
that would make it difficult to implement any meaningful form of uniform civil 
administration. Muslims would and could not be expected to pledge political fealty 
to an alien central state and political efficiency may best be achieved in novel 
political forms (Enayat 1982, 56-7). 
 
Of greater significance however is an event in 1925. Ali Abd Al-Raziq (1888-1966), 
in a small book entitled Al-Islam wa Usul-ul-Hukm (Islam and the Principles of 
Governance) argued for a similar principle, albeit coming from the pen of an Al-
Azhar graduate, renowned religious scholar and Shariah judge. Al-Azhar is the 
second oldest university not only in Islam, but in the world at large today. Based in 
Cairo and founded in the 970s A.D., Al-Azhar remains the most important site of 
classical training in the Arabic Sciences and Sunni Islamic theology (Crecelius 1966, 
40). 
 
Considered the father of Islamic laicism or secularisation, Raziq‟s controversial call 
for the secularisation of the state earned him the infamy of being stripped of his 
status as an Al-Azhar graduate when his degree was rescinded (Tayob 2009, 104-5). 
Raziq‟s laicism argued that there was no need for Islamic government and separated 
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laicism‟s origins in the French revolution. However, it was not based on secularising 
society so much as it advocated the separation of church and state. 
 
The main thrust of Raziq‟s argument is that there must be a clear separation between 
the spheres of the political and the religious because the nature of the Prophet‟s 
mission was entirely religious. The argument rested on three premises which were 
all historical and the argument was thus grounded in traditional religious forms of 
argumentation and justification. The first, in complete contrast to modern political 
Islam theorists, points out that the Qur‟an, Prophetic traditions and general early 
consensus of the classic scholars are all conspicuously absent in advocating the 
utility, legal framework, necessity or obligation of an Islamic state (Abd al-Raziq 
2000, 98-100). 
 
Raziq‟s second premise argued that the Prophet left no explicit instruction on the 
form of government of the extant Islamic Empire. The most telling proof of this lay 
in the fact that he did not even choose a successor nor lay any guidelines for its 
process, which ultimately culminated in the schism between Sunni and Shia: 
The truth is that he (the Prophet Muhammad)...did not mention anything that had to do with a 
government after himself. Nor did he bring to the Muslims laws to which they could turn concerning 
this. He only joined God after the religion was completed (emphasis mine)...The day he...died, his 
prophecy ended, and the special link that was between heaven and his honourable character...was 
cut (Abd al-Raziq 2000). 
 
It is clear from Raziq‟s words that the fact that not only was there no discernible 
guidelines on succession or its implementation, but that this fact points 
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mandate. Since all Muslims believe that the Prophetic mission was completed during 
the Prophet‟s lifetime, a fact vouchsafed for by the Qur‟an, attaching religious 
significance to the politics that followed the Prophet‟s life would not only be absurd, 
but also sacrilegiously contravene the Qur‟an. The Qur‟an explicitly states that 
“[t]oday I (God) have perfected for you your religion and completed My grace upon 
you, and approved Islam as your religion.”
2
 The Qur‟an also states that “We have 
neglected nothing in the Book.”
3
 Thus, Raziq rightfully points out the Qur‟an‟s lack 
of any compulsion of a form of statehood and Caliphate (Enayat 1982, 62).  
 
Raziq‟s third premise rested on the notion that the Prophet was first and foremost a 
religious leader, and while he was also a political leader, there was a clear distinction 
between the two. In making this point, Raziq promised the hope of relegating power 
and hegemony (which was central for Afghani) to an inconsequential facet of Islam 
and its social life. A king or political leader for Raziq was essentially concerned with 
establishing dominion over people for hegemonic and material purposes, but a 
messenger/Prophet had the unique mandate to “make contact with souls...in 
order...to open the hearts of his followers, to come to the roots of love and hate; and 
the origins of good and evil (Raziq, quoted in Tayob 2009: 106). 
 
The Caliphate of the first four Caliphs, who are generally recognised as the 
“Rightfully-guided Caliphs”, was for Raziq in fact a purely historical and contextual 
process. Since the Prophet Muhammad was the final messenger of God and the „Seal 
of Prophet-hood‟, we could not expect the Caliphs, no matter how virtuous they may 
or may not have been, to inherit his spiritual station (Tayob 2009, 106-8). The 
                                                             
2
 The Qur’an, Chapter 5: Verse 3. 
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Caliphs were thus political leaders who relied on the age old traditional basis of 
statecraft: power, military strength and the fear of it. Regarding them as anything 
more than political successors would contradict the most fundamental belief in Islam 
after God‟s Oneness: Muhammad being the final Prophet. “The Caliphate in Islam” 
says Raziq (quoted in Tayob 2009, 108) “was solely based on the principle of feared 
power, and that power in the main was armed material power.” The vocation of a 
political leader was necessarily sullied and materialist, but the Prophet was a 
political leader only insofar as it furthered the interests of spreading God‟s message. 
 
The religious duty of the Prophet permitted him to utilise and subjugate the political 
for the more urgent cause of attaining spiritual and religious goals. Jihad was one 
such means, but it was limited only to the Prophet‟s prerogative and while he was 
still sentient (Tayob 2009, 106-7). Civil administration such as taxation was not part 
of worship. Only that part of it that was related to good social values such as the 
prohibition on interest could be included. As an example, the Arabs were a 
heterogeneous community and there was amongst them “great variance...as regards 
types of government, administrative methods and as regards manners, customs, and 
many of the faculties of material and economic life (Abd al-Raziq 2000, 96).” 
 
Arab unity that was achieved by the Prophet was that of a common spiritual religion 
and not a political unity. This is because the Arabs kept their localised forms of civil 
and state administration. The unity of the Arab Muslims during the Prophet‟s 
lifetime was: 
in no respect a political unity. It had none of the aspects of a state or a government...What 
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interfere in the political direction of the various nations, or that he changed anything in their 
mode of government or in the administrative or judicial regime of their tribes. 
 
Nor did he try to change the social and economic relations existing among the peoples or 
between them and other nations. We never hear that [the Prophet] deprived a governor of 
office, named a judge, organised a police force for these peoples, or regulated their commerce, 
agriculture or industry. 
 
On the contrary, the Prophet left to them concern for all these interests, saying: „You know 
better than anyone.‟ Thus, all these nations with the civil and political unity which they 
respectively enjoyed, with the anarchy and order found among them were joined together only 
by the tie to which we referred, namely the unity of Islam, its precepts and its morals ('Abd al-
Raziq 1982, 33-4). 
Their unity was “not related to the concepts of government and state. However, that 
does not mean that it was a religious unity devoid of political aspects (emphasis 
mine); that is, it was a unity in religion and faith, not a unity of state and types of 
rule (Abd al-Raziq 2000, 96).” 
 
Raziq‟s approach to political Islam is both frighteningly simple and perhaps a tad 
simplistic as well. In his quest to separate a pristine blameless religious sphere from 
an aggressive and imperfect political sphere, his argument is simplistic insofar as it 
glosses over the naturally militaristic means through which the Prophet was able to 
subjugate the Arabs that surrounded him, even if the intent may well have been 
religious. Yet it is also simple but hard to counter because of its grounding in 
religious argumentation. It is no wonder that his work elicited such strong sentiments 
so as to have his degree rescinded.  
 
But more tellingly it is the scope for achieving any form of government and keeping 
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unconstrained by dogma. How is the concept of the state conjured up in the work of 
Raziq? It is clear from Raziq‟s thoughts that his ideas on the state were very much 
encumbered by the classical view on politics and the state. Raziq concurs with the 
dominant view of the state as the monopoliser of violence and that „statecraft‟ is the 
natural role of the state. 
 
Raziq‟s distinction between the religious and the political attempted to enforce a 
patent cleavage between the metaphysical (spirituality and religion) and the 
mundane (politics), similar in some ways to Geertz‟s critique against western social 
sciences. This cleavage while positive from a secular perspective is actually 
dichotomous in its view of state and religion as binary opposites. Whereas for Geertz 
the „symbolic‟ is the dichotomous opposite of the „real‟ in traditional views on the 
state, as is the dichotomies of the “fanciful to [the] sober, figurative to literal, 
obscure to plain, aesthetic to practical, mystical to mundane, and decorative to 
substantial (Geertz 1980, 136), for Raziq the „more‟ real and substantial is the issue 
of virtue and salvation. 
 
The reality of politics and the state necessarily pushes it to drive its own 
interest, and this is temporal and of no benefit. Thus he actually opposes Geertz 
because for him the state can still only work in its mechanical and practical, not 
its symbolic dimension. The role of politics and the state was to establish 
dominion over people for hegemonic and material purposes. Thus the state 
possessed no other utility besides its classically viewed role as an extractor of 
resources, monopoliser of violence and subjugator of the populace through the 
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antithetical to the state. The state was an organ of hegemony; whilst religion 
was about morality and salvation. The prime organ of the political, the state, 
relied on arms, warfare, subjugation and domination to realise the imperatives 
of this world. 
 
The Prophet‟s role as an apostle necessarily meant that his duty was proscribed by 
the message he came with. And this message could not degenerate into the dirty, 
murky business of politics. Rather, it was the Prophet‟s duty to “direct the affairs of 
the body and of the soul, our temporal and spiritual relations: his is the governance 
of the world and all that is concerned with the next world ('Abd al-Raziq 1982, 31).” 
Statehood only held temporal utility during the Prophet‟s life, since only he could 
use it, and that too, only to further his prime duty to “make contact with souls...in 
order...to open the hearts of his followers” so that they could achieve closeness to 
God and their ultimate goal, Paradise. 
 
Raziq says that “if we want to call this religious unit” that the Prophet‟s society, and 
more broadly Islam formed; “„a state‟...we are free to do so. [But] the authority of 
Muhammad over the believers was the authority of apostleship; it had nothing in 
common with temporal power...there was neither government, nor state, nor any type 
of political aspiration, nor any of these ambitions proper to kings and princes ('Abd 
al-Raziq 1982, 32-3).” The basic conception of the state in Raziq‟s work did not vary 
too greatly from that which was conceived by Afghani, even if their broader political 
theories were vastly dissimilar. The state was still the classical organ of rule and 
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capacity to establish and maintain control could be used in the service of religion, for 
Raziq this was sacrilegious. 
 
Whether the state could be used as an instrument of change or foundation of society 
was inconsequential to Raziq, because the political was simply irreligious. The name 
of Islam and its message could not be equated and sullied with an organ such as the 
state. As with Afghani, there was not yet any attachment of a spiritual value or 
symbolic dimension to the state. While for Afghani the state could be used as an 
instrument for advancement, for Raziq advancement was a material issue and had 
nothing to do religion and man‟s prime duty in life, his spirituality. 
 
He did not weigh advancement with progress or stability, even if he highlighted 
control as the duty of the state. Thus he says that the early Muslims were tied 
together by religion, irrespective of whether their societies were characterised by 
“anarchy” or “order” ('Abd al-Raziq 1982, 34). The other major difference was in 
the substantiation. Raziq introduced classical and textual justifications for why the 
state and the political were distinct from the religious. Of course because the texts of 
Islam are such a large body and somewhat ambiguous, what this did was open up the 
methodology of using textual justifications in support or opposition to the Islamic 
state. 
 
These justifications that have continued until today and whose protagonists have 
failed to realise that the ambiguities of the Qur‟an and man‟s capacity for 
substantiating their goals by selective readings and piece-meal quotations, as we 
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exercises in searching for the outcome of interest. Raziq in his work promised the 
hope of relegating power and hegemony (which was central for Afghani) to an 
inconsequential facet of Islam and its social life. Yet this promise of relegation 
actually led to a new direction in the history of the Islamic state simply because 
Raziq reiterated the classical view of the state. 
 
Thus, the unintended consequence of Raziq‟s thesis was primarily negative in that it 
forced the traditionalists and, more importantly, other modernists to counter the 
argument by arguing for a quintessentially Islamic State justified by texts. The basis 
of this would have to be to remove the stigma of the political and attach to it a 
religious justification. Without Raziq‟s work, the history of modern Islamic political 
thought may not have veered so purposefully toward a coherent discourse of finding 
an ultimate Islamic state that would not only form an instrumentalist basis for 
Muslim society, but more pertinently also be glazed by the notion that its very 




Another reformist and contemporary of Raziq was the Syrian/Lebanese Muhammad 
Rashid Rida (1865-1935). Like Raziq, Rida was greatly influenced by Abduh and 
the Journal Al-Urwa al Wuthqa that was written in conjunction with Afghani in 
Paris. Rida immigrated to Egypt before the turn of the turn of the 20
th
 century. From 
there he began the journal Al-Manar (The Lighthouse) in collaboration with his 
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want the continuance of the Ottoman Empire, but for him it was more because he 
thought it was not a true Islamic state (Enayat 1982, 70-1). Thus the idea of a state 
that was fundamentally „Islamic‟ can be traced to Rida.  
 
Unlike Raziq however, Rida‟s vision of a state was intrinsically linked to Islam and 
its potential and capacity to deliver justice. Rida‟s envisioning of a state was a state 
that was expressly Islamic, and was somewhat akin to the theory behind, if not the 
actual practise, of what we may refer to as a participatory albeit non-secular 
democracy. The pivot around which Rida‟s theory of the Islamic state was 
formulated was, like the popular discourse that was brewing in Russia and 
elsewhere, based on the people. But Rida‟s envisaging of the people was quite far 
apart from the Marxist wave that was ebbing and flowing around the world. 
 
Rida wanted the will of the people to be realised in government, to protect from 
autocracy and capricious rule. Much like Trotsky‟s worldwide revolution, using the 
people as a starting point, Rida brought into focus one of the most enduring themes 
of modern political Islam, the Ummah (the collective “community” of worldwide 
believers). Islamic government for Rida translated into government for the Ummah 
as a whole. “The authority of the Ummah” Rida says, was vested in “the necessity of 
consultation with its members” and that this was a government compelled by Islam 
(Rida 1922, 5). 
 
Thus, the first real conception of the state as an Islamic compulsion and duty can be 
traced to Rida as well. But, unlike his successors, for Rida this idea of an Islamic 
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an unqualified subservience to religious law. For achieving the will of the people he 
favoured a republic, wherein the leader would be accountable to the law as every 
other citizen. The leader, Rida says “is not distinguishable in relation to [the state‟s] 
laws from the weakest of its subjects. He simply executes the rule of law and the 
view (emphasis mine) of the Ummah (Rida 1922, 5).” 
 
Pledging allegiance to a leader, as it was in the case for the first Caliph Abu Bakr, 
must be done “after obtaining opinion of the majority of Muslims (Rida 1922, 13).” 
It is quite clear from this that Rida was making a bold case for a future Islamic state 
based on the argument that popular will was the basis for the Prophet and the first 
Caliph‟s rule. Because Rida‟s was the first attempt at an articulate justification of an 
Islamic state, he needed some corroborative basis for his argument. 
 
This was accomplished by his drawing of a distinction between Deen (faith) as 
exemplified by worship, and shar’ (legislation or practicability), as exemplified by 
social relations. For Rida matters of faith and worship such as the praying five times 
a day were incontrovertible and required no new re-evaluation. On the other hand, 
matters of practicability and social relations possessed the capacity for Ijtihad 
(independent new judgment from re-evaluation of the texts). The organisation of 
social relations such as “administration, judiciary, politics, taxes, the preparation for 
war which has nothing to do with worship or closeness to God in its details, was 
made by the Prophet because he was a legislator (emphasis mine) in his time with 
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For Rida then, acts of worship loosely corresponded to the Shariah as mentioned in 
the conceptualisation of this essay, because it was non-negotiable, perennial and 
divine. However the practicable corresponded more to Fiqh (jurisprudence) and 
possessed malleability to it because it was ephemeral. However, the practicable was 
still under the domain of religion because it had to be guided by the substantive parts 
of Islamic law. Rida felt that the Islamic Shariah was the most magnanimous and 
that the state had to be Islamic because the Shariah’s magnanimity was based on its 
recognition of, and susceptibility to, change (Tayob 2009, 111-2). 
 
Furthermore, below the leader or Caliph, a body of respected elite comprised of 
scholars referred to as the ahl al-Hall wa’l-aqd (“the people who loosen and bind”) 
should be in place to make important decisions (Rida 1922, 13). These scholars who 
were also to be chosen by the people would be responsible and act as a link between 
the Ummah and Caliph. The Sunni scholars he felt had lost much of their say over 
affairs of the state and society. The weakness of their position in relation to their 
Shi‟a counterparts was a matter of concern to Rida (Rida 1922, 60). 
 
Ultimately, it was this theory of the need for custodianship of the scholars that would 
return with renewed vigour in the works of Khomeini (Enayat 1989, 165). But 
whereas in Khomeini, the custodians were to be defined by clerical review and 
scholarly hierarchy, the scholars envisaged in Rida‟s work would derive their 
legitimacy from the people themselves. Rida found a greater audience for his view 
on the Islamic state than Raziq because, naturally, Muslims wanted to feel that 
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was all the more acute because by this time, the stereotype of the Oriental despot, 
based as it was largely on some truth, was in vogue. 
 
How then was the state conceived for Rida? For Rida, the state was indeed a duty, 
but not entirely as a normative order. Its utility was again based somewhat on the 
instrumentalist role that Afghani pointed out. The state through its use of the Shariah 
could guide society. But in turn the state‟s mandate was entirely reliant on the 
people. It derived its legitimacy from the people. The state possessed its own power 
in the sense that it was the duty of the state and the scholars that oversee it to ensure 
that the substantive elements of the Shariah guided it. 
 
The distinction between the perennial elements of faith such as the five prayers and 
malleable social relations indeed highlighted Rida‟s most significant idea of an 
Islamic state: like broader Fiqh (jurisprudence), its susceptibility to change. For him, 
the more significant functions of the state such as “administration, judiciary, politics, 
taxes [and] the preparation for war” had “nothing to do with worship or closeness to 
God (Rida 1922, 22).” 
 
Thus, the state in its legislative capacity could define its own policies since these 
held no metaphysical truth nor measured one‟s closeness to God. The Prophet after 
all was a “legislator in his [own] time” and applied and employed his own „Ijtihad‟ 
to administer the affairs of the state (Rida 1922, 22). The requirement for the 
Shariah as not an all-encompassing credo, but rather a guide to the affairs of the 
state, for Rida, rested on its ability to deal with change (Tayob 2009, 111-2). In fact 
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is inviolable as well as almost the entire conventional thinking of western social 
science‟s view on Islam and especially the Shariah, as incapable of dealing with 
modernity and change. 
 
Rida‟s theory is also based somewhat on those of Raziq‟s. The former‟s distinction 
between faith/worship and the practicable/social relations are somewhat similar to 
Raziq‟s distinction between the religious as existential and the political as the 
mundane. But whereas Raziq completely downplays the role of the religious in the 
affairs of the political, for Rida it is essential .This is because the capacity of Islam to 
deliver justice makes the state that is Islamic the most capable of doing so. The right 
of popular sovereignty provides the other half of the construction of the state. It is 
not entirely clear however, from Rida‟s theory whether the right of absolute 
sovereignty lies with the people to the extent that they can even challenge laws that 
are argued by some to be those of worship. 
 
For example there is no clear idea of, when aspects of the Shariah such as polygamy 
come into opposition with popular will, whether popular will trumps the textual 
evidence on the issue. Perhaps what is being suggested is that the two provide an 
equal claim to defining the state, but of course this is purely conjecture. In reality, 
what Rida was trying to suggest is that within Islam and the confines of the Shariah 
lay the most egalitarian and for him the truest form of democracy. We must 
remember that like Afghani and his successors, Islam promised a real capacity; 
however misinformed our natural prejudices may suggest this is, for developing a 
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Amidst the proliferation of global insecurity that terrorism has brought, a common 
thing we ignore is that for the ideologues of a modern political Islam, their theories 
of Islam in the political sphere were entirely regenerative. Based as it was on 
upliftment of their society in the face of European ascendancy and Islamic ebb, they 
attempted to deal with modernity as the realities of their own dictated. By arguing 
that Rida opened the way for the Islamic state to become the global threat it has 
become is correct insofar as some of those who followed through with his ideas have 
resorted to violent means to achieve it, or that others have continued the rapacious 
control of Muslim lands by arguing that what they suppose as the laws of the 
religion, such as women‟s veiling, are non-negotiable aspects of worship. 
 
But it would also miss the point to completely write off Rida‟s theory on the Islamic 
State as the non-secular Pandora‟s Box that has resulted in the continued attempt to 
force religion on the state and maintain anti-democratic strictures such as polygamy. 
Rida‟s work opened up the possibility for seeing politics as a means to achieve a 
better society while still being grounded in religion. It was the modernity of a 
scholar who himself was against the traditional establishment and its impotence 
when dealing with social issues (Tayob 2009, 109-11). 
 
Yet by placing the state as a religious duty, Rida opened up the paving of the 
„normativisation‟ of the state through its symbolisation and the investment of the 
religious within it. For him the state was still instrumentalist: to achieve a better 
society and reflect and constitute popular will. But for those that followed, this 
investment of Islamic duty in establishing a state provided a new angle to look at the 
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control and therefore irreligious could now be met head-on in argumentative 
opposition. 
 
This is because Rida saw the political and legislative potential of the state as 
constitutive of the religious, even if these were not as significant as matters of 
worship. The idea that legislation in the form of social relations was susceptible to 
change and contextualisation would be lost in the works of those that took up the 
mantle in the articulation of the Islamic state. While Rida‟s work was a preliminary 
impression that identified a need for a state based on the malleable aspect of the 
Shariah in a period of social upheaval and change; the next group of scholars, more 
articulate in their elaborations of how the state should work, would arise. And that, 












Page | 55 
5. The ‘Normativisation’ of the Islamic State and Fundamentalism 
 
The new discourse of the Islamic State after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, 
beginning with Rida‟s treatise became more radical; more opposed to the west, and 
in some cases even promoted or utilized mass mobilization. Sayyid Qutb began to 
promote a broad based Islamist vanguard movement, and in his homeland Egypt, this 
gained some momentum with his movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. The force of 
mobilisation that they enjoyed at times of non-state repression was gargantuan. 
Although after the deaths of its illustrious leaders Al-Banna and Qutb, in the 1970s 
Friday prayer gatherings consisted of more than 250,000 people, completely 
bringing central Cairo to a standstill and “reminding the Sadat government of the 
organisational strength of the Muslim Brotherhood (Hanson 2006, 78-9).” 
 
While the earlier scholars this paper has analysed can be termed modernists insofar 
as they were willing to accommodate change in their writings of the Islamic state, 
the writings of Qutb and Mawdudi marked the turn to what we have now come to 
call fundamentalism. This turn toward fundamentalism was perhaps an unintended 
consequence of the earlier theorists such as Afghani, Abduh and Rida. While the 
early emphasis mainly promoted a syncretism between a Muslim and western polity, 
in effect if not explicitly said, the new literature on the Islamic state now assumed a 
more explicit separation between the two. 
 
But yet as Tayob (2009, 44) has pointed out, the works of these modernists such as 
Afghani, Abduh and Rida are not vastly dissimilar to other religious presentations, 
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“religion and Islam as stable centres in a bewildering and fast-changing world.” The 
fundamentalists for their part have earned their designation because they see the 
fundamentals of religion as non-negotiable and for the most, see no separation 
between life, religion and politics. Their “unwillingness to compromise on Islam 
(Tayob 2009, 44)” and pre-occupation with religious authenticity has come to be 
much feared in the western world. 
 
For the fundamentalists, the idea of a uniquely Islamic system of government, in 
contra-distinction to a decadent western system began to gain currency during the 
last years of colonialism and then subsequently after the 1970s when the institutional 
weaknesses and corruption of the newly independent states wreaked havoc on their 
populaces. Where Rida opened up the possibility of the state and political being part 
of the religious/spiritual and not based on material power (as Raziq conceptualised 
it), the fundamentalists would take this further. After Rida the Islamic state begun to 
be conceived of as a separate analytical category and a totalised whole that was part 
of God‟s design. 
 
No more was the articulation of the Islamic state an attempt to make sense of the role 
Islam can play in the polity or state. With Qutb, Mawdudi and later Khomeini the 
state assumed a life and obligation on its own. The Islamic state begun to be 
theorised less as a facilitator of new circumstances for Muslims, but increasingly 
more as an Islamic obligation that a Muslim had to fulfil. The political nature of the 
Prophet‟s achievements in establishing the Islamic Empire began to be weighted 
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in opposition to the clear distinction Raziq tried to postulate and Rida had taken 
cognisance of. 
 
Islam alone singles out God for worship when it singles Him out for sovereignty and the right to 
create a method for the life of humanity (Qutb 1983). 
The above quote from Qutb highlights the turn in the literature. Now the emphasis 
was on the polity as a whole acting out God‟s law. And the only way to achieve this 
would be to establish an Islamic State to enforce these laws so that society reflected 




Abul A‟la Mawdudi (1903-1979) was an Indian (later Pakistani) ideologue who was 
a self-trained Islamic scholar and also a prominent journalist. Initially opposed to 
partition because he felt that a universal religion like Islam could not be used to form 
a nationalist state (Pakistan), he eventually supported the call for an independent 
Pakistan seeing in its establishment “a promise for the rebirth of Islam (Enayat 1982, 
102).” Unlike the radical sway that was fomenting in Egypt, Mawdudi used 
constitutional means to try to affect the political process and helped to establish his 
own party, the Jamat-e Islami, the oldest party in Pakistan today. Despite having 
acrimonious relations with liberal politicians and secularists, he submitted proposals 
on the Draft Constitution and his party disciples acknowledged the legitimacy of the 
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His political writings however, were vastly dissimilar to this rather benign 
participation in Pakistani politics. Mawdudi is well recognised as one of the fathers 
of fundamentalism, though the more peaceful as compared to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. He was also the most prominent, articulate and consistent ideologue of 
modern Islamist thought (Tayob 2009, 85). As testimony to the admiration he 
garnered, he was also the only modern non-Arab whose works have been translated 
into Arabic by the early 80s (Enayat 1982, 101). 
 
The astuteness of Mawdudi‟s approach to political Islam lay in its treating of the 
state as a theological argument. His theory is the closest to a relatively coherent 
enunciation of the Islamic state, incorporating the economic, social and political; 
whilst being informed and vigilant, if not convinced, by secular ideologies and social 
science theories (Enayat 1989, 102-3). This paper shall only focus on his political 
writings with regard to what the state is. 
 
For Mawdudi, the Prophet‟s mission was to bring the final message to the believers. 
This message that was carried out was the “final code (emphases mine) of human 
guidance in all its completeness (Mawdudi 1976, 149).” For him the final code that 
the Prophet brought contained all aspects of the social world. For Mawdudi, those 
who argue that the Islam does not possess an “Islamic political theory, Islamic social 
order and Islamic culture” and those that claimed “that Islam contains within itself 
the elements of all types of contemporary social and political thought and action” 
suffer from an inferiority complex owing to the dominant position of the west 
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Just as the normative order constructs a realm of the unity of forces, Mawdudi (1976, 
148) argues that Islam is “a well-ordered system, a consistent whole”. Mawdudi 
ascribes to the concept of Tawhid (Unity of the God-Head or God‟s Oneness), the 
most fundamental in Islam, the basis and „seed‟ for all social and political life.  
Tawhid is so significant in Islam because it was the major novelty of the Prophet‟s 
message to the polytheist Arabs to believe in One God as opposed to the idols that 
were popular in the Mecca and the rest of Arabia. Even murder is pardonable but 
Shirk (polytheism or associating partners with God) remains the most serious 
offence in Islam and the only one that is unpardonable in the eyes of God (Kramer 
1997, 76). 
 
The linking of Tawhid with a pre-ordained political system is both fantastically 
conjured up, as well as frighteningly simple. Pointing to the Qur‟an, Mawdudi 
highlights that the dispute of Muhammad and the many Prophets before him with 
their enemies was not one of the existence or denial of God (Mawdudi 1976, 150). 
The Qur‟anic verse clearly states that “if you asked them (the unbelievers) who 
created them, they will surely say God. How then are they turned away?”
4
 From here 
Mawdudi separates the Arabic terms of Rabb (Lord) from Ilah (Master and Law-
Giver) (Mawdudi 1976, 150). 
 
He deduces that the “uncompromising demand of the Prophets” was that the non-
believers should not only accept God as their Lord, since they already recognised 
this, but also that they should acknowledge him as the only rightful Law-Giver 
(Mawdudi 1976, 150). Ilah translates into „Him who is the Object of Worship‟. This 
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does not only place emphasis on ritual prayer, but also a complete and perennial 
obedience as a slave to his Lord in whatever that Lord‟s instruction (Mawdudi 1976, 
151). 
 
Rabb on the other hand literally means „one who nourishes and sustains‟. It could 
also mean Master or owner and someone who we generally owe our allegiance to: a 
patron for example (Mawdudi 1976, 151-2). Anyone can be this in some limited 
form such as the Lord of the Manor or a mother to a child. The biggest problem that 
flows from this distinction is man‟s relation to it. Mawdudi goes on to say that for no 
other creature is the idea of Lordship as enticing as it is to humans. Man‟s inherent 
desire is to first gain the title of Rabb and then ultimately to define one‟s very life as 
a Law-giver or Ilah does. 
 
This preponderance of power–whether in the name of ideology or even the vast sway 
of the papacy–for him is the roots of all man‟s problems. Mawdudi shows how 
abreast he is of international affairs, considering this treatise was written in 1939, 
when he rightly points to the power of ideology in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
even America and Britain, no doubt referring to the roots of the future Cold War. He 
terms all these ideologies as „false gods‟ and the sole cause of all miseries and 
conflicts (Mawdudi 1976, 151-6). 
 
After explaining this desire of man‟s desire for overlordship over others, Mawdudi 
attempts to get back to his thesis. The first point he stresses is what he calls „First 
Principle of Islamic Political Theory‟ and this is “[t]he belief in the unity and the 
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the Prophets (Mawdudi 1976, 158).” This for Mawdudi (1976, 158) “is the starting-
point of the Islamic political philosophy...that human-beings must, individually and 
collectively, surrender all (emphases mine) rights of overlordship, legislation and 
the exercising of authority over others.” No single individual can pass orders “in his 
own right” but they must obligingly accept the sovereignty of God. 
 
To prove that the right to legislation vests in God alone, he quotes the following 
piece-meal verses of the Qur‟an: 
The authority rests with none but God. He commands you not to surrender to anyone 
save Him. This is the right way (of life).5 
They ask „have we also got some authority?‟ Say: „all authority belongs to God alone‟.6 
Do not say wrongly with your tongues that this is lawful and that is unlawful.7 
Whoso does not establish and decide by that which God has revealed, such are 
disbelievers.8 
 
These verses for Mawdudi point incontrovertibly to the „fact‟ that in legislation, 
only God‟s laws could be followed. Accepting other men as law-makers would 
equate to denying God‟s Oneness and exclusive right as the only Law-Maker. Not 
following God‟s laws would thus be tantamount to Shirk (polytheism), which as 
explained is the most cardinal sin in Islam. He does not consider that the third of the 
above verses which warns against wrongly declaring some things lawful and others 
not, could refer to himself as well. But that is a debate best left to other platforms. 
 
In summarising the basis for the Islamic state and the Qur‟anic injunctions that flow 
from his cited verses, Mawdudi (1976, 159) points out these three conclusions: 
                                                             
5 The Qur’an, Chapter 12: Verse 40. 
6 The Qur’an, Chapter 3: Verse 154. 
7
 The Qur’an, Chapter 16: Verse 116. 
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(1) No person, class or group, not even the entire population of the state as a whole, can lay claim to 
sovereignty. God alone is the real sovereign; all others are merely His subjects; 
(2) God is the real law-giver and the authority of absolute legislation vests in Him. The believers cannot 
resort to totally independent legislation nor can they modify any law which God has laid down, even if 
the desire to effect such legislation or change in Divine laws is unanimous9; and 
(3) An Islamic state must, in all respects, be founded upon the law laid down by God, through His 
Prophet. The government which runs such a state will be entitled to obedience in its capacity as a 
political agency set up to enforce the laws of God and only in so far as it acts in that capacity. If it 
disregards the law revealed by God, its commands will not be binding on the believers. 
 
Mawdudi asserts that perhaps the most accurate description of the Islamic state is to 
term it a „theo-democracy‟. This is because it still allows for a form of democracy 
since all men are equal before the divine law. But these laws are subject to the 
sovereignty of God (Mawdudi 1976, 160). On the other hand the Islamic state is a 
theocracy insofar as it follows God‟s laws, but is at a variance with the European 
conception of such a state where a priestly class “exercises unchecked domination 
and enforces laws of its own making in the name of God (Mawdudi 1976, 160).” 
 
For him the state is ruled not by a priestly class, but by the whole community of 
believers, including the „rank and file‟. It is this last point that deserves our attention. 
The pointing to a „rank and file‟ denotes some form of hierarchy within this 
conception which Mawdudi denies. For one Mawdudi (1976, 160) acknowledges 
that the foundations of Islamic political philosophy are based on “the sovereignty of 
God and (emphasis mine) the vicegerency (Khilafah) of man.” 
                                                             
9
 NB. What Mawdudi is referring to here is the right of ‘absolute legislation’ which encompass laws 
which he feels are explicitly ‘laid down’ by God. With regard to the practicable laws that Raziq and 
Rida referred to, Mawdudi does indeed allow for human scope in legislation as shall be elaborated 
on later. In fact he allows for independent juristic interpretation of the texts in contrast to 
traditionalist scholars who say the early consensus of the classical scholars have to take precedence 
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Mawdudi (1976, 168) then goes on to state that since the God is the only sovereign 
in the Islamic state, naturally “the persons who set out to enforce God‟s law…should 
be regarded as representatives of the Supreme Ruler (God).” But then he goes on to 
state that within this Islamic state, “everyone is a caliph of God and an equal 
participant in this caliphate (Mawdudi 1976, 168)”. The role of all citizens is to 
ensure God‟s sovereignty is respected. This emphasis on each man being an equal 
vicegerent is both romanticised and simplistic. Perhaps realising that acknowledging 
any form of hierarchy would naturally disprove his own thesis that no man can be an 
overlord over another, he resorts to this fanciful explanation. 
 
Yet only two pages earlier, Mawdudi (1976, 166) says that the state could only be 
run: 
by those who believe in the ideology on which it is based and the Divine Law which it is assigned 
to administer. The administration of the Islamic state must be those whose whole life is devoted to 
the observance and enforcement of this Law, who not only agree with its reformatory program and 
fully believe in it but thoroughly comprehend its spirit and are acquainted with its details. 
The implicit reference to a hierarchy is in fact surreptitiously introduced here. Only 
those who have devoted their whole life to observing and enforcing God‟s law could 
qualify as leaders of the Islamic state. Whether this qualification was limited to the 
pious, the cleric or the ideologue is not clear.  
 
How is the state conceptualised in Mawdudi‟s theoretical premises? Just like in the 
Balinese Negaras where the state was a total realm that incorporated the political as 
part of the religious and social, Mawdudi equates the state as representative of Islam 
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consistent whole (Mawdudi 1976, 148).” The wholeness of Islam‟s system could not 
be limited to private ritualism, but had to be as in Geertz‟s description of the Negara 
the “axis around which the public life of society revolved (Geertz 1980, 123).” 
 
Theoretically, the state was neither the Machiavellian controller of society nor the 
Weberian mediated bureaucracy, but was the actual domain of God and his laws. 
The political became collapsed within all that is social. And all that is social is 
religious, for Islam is a “well-ordered system” and “consistent whole”. By pointing 
to Tawhid, Mawdudi constructed the totality of the state as one unending realm. If 
you denied God‟s Oneness then not only are you not a believer, but you do not 
accept the totalised realm. 
 
The state became invested with being the totalising whole since God‟s sovereignty 
was acted out through it. In fact, what Mawdudi may actually be saying was quite 
heretical in that for God‟s sovereignty to be acted out, it could only be done through 
the institution of an Islamic state; this despite Muslims believing in God‟s 
omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence. Life in this concept could only be 
political in its acceptance of God‟s sovereignty as the only Law-Maker, since there 
was no place for other ideologies or preferences that contradicted the Divine Law 
much like the political in the Balinese Negara was acted through the emotions and 
court ceremonies of its people. 
 
The major difference of Mawdudi‟s approach to the Balinese case is his equating of 
social class and rank as just one form of man‟s desire of overlordship over other 
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represented and signified an individual‟s closeness to the core of the state: the 
divine. Yet a more careful consideration of the substantive argument of Mawdudi 
may point out that in fact what Mawdudi is saying is that people should only have 
one Lord, and that is God. In relation to that God, that divine, all actions that were 
political should be regulated by the law of that God. 
 
Moreover, Mawdudi (1976, 166) asserts that the Islamic state can only be run “by 
those who believe in the ideology on which it is based and the Divine Law which it 
is assigned to administer [and] whose whole life is devoted to the observance and 
enforcement of this Law.” This of course opens up a hierarchy. This hierarchy itself 
is not divinely ordained or a religious duty as it would become in Khomeini, but it 
nonetheless introduces a hierarchy of exemplars as in the Balinese Negara. This 
hierarchy was not of caste but rather of knowledge or piety. 
 
This „normativisation‟ of the state was not entirely free of the conventional 
instrumentalist view of the state in Political Science however. In fact in Mawdudi‟s 
own words he terms the state “an instrument of reform (Mawdudi 1976, 166).” 
Moreover, he identifies the need for the Islamic state as necessary because “the great 
mass[es] of common people are incapable of perceiving their own true (emphasis 
mine) interests (Mawdudi 1976, 162).” 
 
Because of this the Divine Limits (Hudud-Allah) provides restrictions on freedoms 
such as the veiling of women which recognise man‟s guardianship over them to 
ensure that society does not descend into moral decadence (Mawdudi 1976, 163). 
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does not deprive him of any essential liberty (Mawdudi 1976, 164).” This anti-
democratic instrumentalism of the state for Mawdudi however, is neither like the 
instrumentalism of Afghani where the state was at the service of reviving Islam, nor 
the instrumentalism of Rida where the state could help establish a real society of 
justice. For him the state as instrument was subject to God‟s ownership of its domain 
and thus God‟s sovereignty, no matter what personal ideas of justice the individual 
may have on certain issues. 
 
Thus, the state was established as Islamic normative order in the works of Mawdudi, 
without doing away with some of the connotations of the conventional instrumental 
role of the state. This tension would continue unabated in the works of Khomeini 
and for every Muslim thereafter who has accepted such a „normativised‟ conception 
of an Islamic state. But whereas for Geertz, the representation of the Negara was 
positive or neutral, in analysing Mawdudi it is clear that this normativised state is 
negative, and would have to rely on the quelling of dissent and debate. 
 
It is well and good to invest the Islamic state with such Divine symbolism, but can 
the entire populace ever agree to its limitations or live out the political mediated by 
their relation to the divinity in a totalised stately realm such as the Balinese Negara. 
This more so when strictures such as women‟s veiling and capital punishment are 
sometimes so flagrantly unpalatable to many and go against their common sense of 
justice. Ultimately, investing symbolism in a state can never truly break free from 
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5.2 Khomeini 
Ayatollah Ruhullah Mousavi Khomeini is unlike the other theorists of political 
Islam. This is because he was actually the most important figure in a real revolution 
and would go on to become the most important political leader in Iran. Also unlike 
the other scholars in this paper aside from Afghani who were Sunni, Khomeini was a 
Shiite. A highly qualified cleric, Khomeini‟s writings must be divided into two 
periods. The first, before 1963, was aimed more at the Shah and urged him to respect 
the Constitution and desist from inequity and oppression. He may have been 
suspicious of the Constitution, but acquiesced to its place in society. Within this, the 
place of the cleric was merely that of the jurist or teacher (Martin 2000, 108-114). 
 
By 1963 however, the political landscape of the country changed forever. The 
catalyst for the “events of 1963 was the granting of capitulatory [oil] rights to U.S. 
nationals and advisors in Iran in the ensuing year (Dorraj, 1990: 156).” This was 
seen as the continuation of western imperialism and neo-colonialism, and protests 
ensued when people took to the streets. The slaying of unarmed Iranians in the 1963 
rebellion “sounded the death knell for the Pahlavi monarchy (Dorraj 1990, 158).” 
Not only did it forever change the political landscape of Iran, it opened up the 
radicalisation of many, prime of who was Khomeini. As an example, Khomeini 
(quoted in Dhorraj 1990, 159) remarking on these events says: 
The monarchy in Iran, from its inception to this day –God be my witness– has 
inflicted miseries and perpetrated enormous crimes. The crimes of the Persian 
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ordered massacres of people and piled their severed heads into pyramids? The 
very best of these shahs were ruthless ruffians. 
 
After 1963, Khomeini‟s ideas became highly politicised, and we see the 
burgeoning conception of the Islamic state, the struggle for which was equated 
with Ali‟s son Husayn‟s martyrdom at Karbala against the tyranny of the Sunni 
caliph Yazid (Enayat, 1982: 194). Khomeini was exiled to France and then Iraq 
for his vehement opposition to the Shah, from where he continued his critique 
of the Shah. The Shah‟s reign ended in 1979 when he abdicated the Peacock 
Throne (Ehteshami 1995, 1). 
 
Khomeini‟s ideas of an Islamic state were developed in a series of lectures in the 
1970s and these were later collected in a book. The English translation of this book 
by Hamid Algar (Khomeini 1981) will primarily be utilised by this paper. The basis 
of the Islamic state in Khomeini‟s writing centred on a theory which, pronounced in 
its correct Arabic form is Wilayat-e Faqih, and in its Persian form is Velayat-e 
Faqih. Literally translating into the „Guardianship of the Jurisconsult‟, the Wilayat is 
premised on the notion that in the absence of the twelfth Imam of the Ithna Asharia 
(Twelver) Shi‟a, temporal authority must devolve to the righteous and most 
knowledgeable of the clerics, the Fuqaha (jurists) of the time (Jahanbakhsh 2001, 
130-5). 
 
Because Shia doctrine traditionally opposes the rulership of Sunnis or anyone beside 
the infallible Imams, it has been the duty of the clerics (Ulema) to check against all 
forms of leadership. Since the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, the Twelvers have 
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and is thus not mortally dead, all authority during the period of this occultation is 
thought to be illegitimate. The Wilayat is not entirely a novelty in Shiite theology. It 
had exponents of such a theory from as early as classical and medieval times in 
Shi‟ism. However, its novel implementation in the Iranian concept went even further 
by legally instituting the position of a single Wali-e Faqih (Guardianship of the 
Jurisconsult), who is the Supreme leader able to exercise any power, or veto any 
decision in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Enayat, 1989, 160-2). 
 
For Khomeini Islamic government is unlike any “existing forms of government 
(Khomeini 1981, 55). Like Mawdudi, Khomeini defines the Islamic state as the “rule 
of divine law over men [wherein] the legislative power and competence to establish 
laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty (Khomeini 1981, 55).” Like Mawdudi he 
also places the state as the domain of God‟s sovereignty: 
Islamic government is a government of law. In this form of government, sovereignty 
belongs to God alone and law is His decree and command (Khomeini 1981, 56). 
 
The necessity to establish an Islamic state is linked to the Shi‟i belief that the 
Prophet chose Ali as his successor before he died. He states that after the Prophet‟s 
death, everyone recognised the need for government, but there “was disagreement 
[between Sunni and Shi‟a] only as to which person should assume responsibility for 
government and head of state (Khomeini 1981, 43).” Since in the occultation period 
of the 12
th
 Imam, all temporal authority is seen by the Shi‟i as illegitimate, 
Khomeini contends that the only people who could rule during this time are the 
fuqaha (jurists). Since there is no real way of knowing when the 12
th
 Imam will 
return, the fuqaha should rule over society to ensure that God‟s law is implemented 
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Since Islamic government is a government of law, those acquainted with the law, or 
precisely with religion –i.e, the fuqaha– must supervise its functioning. It is they who 
supervise all executive and administrative affairs of the country, together with all 
planning (Khomeini 1981, 79). 
 
The jurists for Khomeini “are the fortresses of Islam...They must do whatever is 
necessary to fulfil that duty. It is one of their most important duties and moreover, 
an absolute duty, not a conditional one (Khomeini 1981, 74).” The jurists inherit the 
political station of the Prophet and the Imams because of their knowledge of God‟s 
law, even though they can never inherit their blameless spiritual station: 
When we say that after the Occultation, the just faqih has the same authority as the Most 
Noble Messenger and the Imams had, do not imagine that the status of the faqih is identical 
to that of the Imams and the Prophet. For here we are not speaking about status, but function 
(Khomeini 1981, 62). 
 
The prime reason why the jurists should rule in the absence of the hidden 
Imam is because they are the most knowledgeable. Here Khomeini cites the 
belief of the Shi‟a in Ali‟s claim to be the immediate successor to the Prophet. 
The Shiites believe that not only was Ali superior to Abu Bakr and the other 
caliphs in virtue, but that he was also the most knowledgeable on the laws and 
ordinances of Islam: 
The view of the Shi‟a concerning government and the nature of the persons who 
should assume rule was clear from the time of the Prophet (upon whom be peace 
and blessings) down to the beginning of the Occultation. It specified that the ruler 
should be foremost in knowledge of the laws and ordinances of Islam (emphasis 
mine) and just in their implementation. Now that we are in the time of the 
Occultation of the Imam...the establishment of government is still a necessity 
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When Khomeini and Mawdudi came forth with their theories, they did not 
desire to institute a state wherein Islamic law would provide the basis of 
stability, command and obedience. In reality, they were introducing a symbolic 
dimension to why Muslims should live in the archetypal state of their writings 
and why that state was connected to God‟s divine design. The adherence to 
Islamic law was not simply a corollary of an instrumental state, the institution 
of which would be something better than the Shah‟s Iran or post-colonial 
Pakistan. It was in fact the very way God intended society to be lived. Islam 
could not be lived only in the private; its obligation was to be lived in a united 
sphere, where all distinctions are collapsed with no differentiation between the 
social, the political and the reality that encompassed all of this. 
 
Just as the king was indistinguishable from the realm in the Negara, the 12
th
 
Imam who was in occultation and ultimately Ali before him, constituted the 
very essence of why the state was needed for Khomeini. Ali and the 12
th
 Imam 
needed to act out the political to realise God‟s will. For if Ali‟s role was only 
spiritual, then why would the Shia feel he was done an injustice when Abu Bakr 
succeeded the Prophet. Just as Ali‟s life represented all the greatest aspects of 
morality, character and intelligence, it also represented the entirety of the 
political and social life, like the court ceremonies dramatic plays, court titles 
and eulogies represented in Bali. 
 
When Khomeini asserts that the fuqaha are the inheritors of the Prophet‟s 
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are the representatives of the 12
th
 Imam during his occultation. It was through 
the clerics whose knowledge of the sacred texts connected society to the divine 
that unjust and immoral politics do not have to be the dominant mode of life in 
the Imam‟s absence. This was like how the Balinese priests connected the 
sacred to the populace and were the emblematic executers of divineness. The 
Wali-e Faqih and more broadly all the jurists were similar to the Balinese 
priests who were “parts of the king‟s regalia...learned in religious law, adept in 
ritual...virtuous...an embodiment of part of that (divine) authority, and extension 
of the king‟s (the 12
th
 Imam?) official person (Geertz 1980, 126).” 
  
The jurist, like in Bali, was to be a guide to the populace with his knowledge 
and actions, demonstrating the ideal relationship to the king (12
th
 Imam?) and 
the divine. This relationship would exemplify the perfect relation between ruler 
and subject and was the example to the populace of how to serve one‟s God. 
The realm of the state now became part of one realm connected to the Divine 
via the cleric and the Imams. Just like in Bali, God owned the realm and the 
state was the religious design reflected in the hierarchies within a „sacred 
space‟. 
 
When Khomeini presented his argument for the rule of the jurists, his argument 
naturally rested on the existence of a natural hierarchy where the cleric was the 
most authoritative in deciding about important issues or interpreting the Islamic 
texts with regard to the state. This was not the same as the how caste and status 
was ordered in the Bali of Geertz, but it implied that such a hierarchy was 
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wherein every person was accounted for, in Khomeini‟s theory there was the 
cleric and the populace. 
 
Yet to accept the seniority of the Wali-e Faqih, as in Geertz (1980: 123) is to 
accept the naturalness of “the axis around which the public life of society 
revolve[s].” The gradation that distinguishes the hidden Imam as spiritual 
leader, the cleric as temporal overseer of the polity and the general populace, 
implies not that those who are non-clerics are less human, just less able to 
oversee society and the running of the state within God‟s design. This 
corresponds somewhat to the hierarchy of exemplars in the caste system in Bali 
where lower castes were a coarser version of the caste above and was not in the 
Marxist analysis less real, but rather just less exquisite and less potent (Geertz 
1980, 128-31). 
 
Within this conception, the citizenry who live in this realm benefit from its 
blessings and energies and are thus collectively responsible for meeting the 
ritual and moral obligations that this entailed, such as living by the laws of 
Islam. Like in Bali, the political community cannot be separated from the realm 
which “at base [is] not a social, political or economic unit, but a religious one 
(Geertz 1980, 129)”, just as all social life should be. 
 
As with Mawdudi, the instrumentalist role of the state still featured in Khomeini‟s 
theory. For example Khomeini contends that legal cases “that a Shari’a judge in 
earlier times settled in one or two days cannot be settled now in twenty years 
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westernisation, he highlights the potential for the Shariah to make administration 
easier. He says that a lawyer once told him that because of the protracted back-and-
forth nature of the Shah‟s judicial machinery, litigations can drag on so long that his 
son will even inherit the cases (Khomeini 1981, 32). 
 
He expands on this idea of bureaucratic red-tape to explain that all western law has 
done is complicate Iranian‟s lives and do more to curtail their legal rights. Khomeini 
(1981, 32) also says that the result is not the only important thing, but procedure is 
too. He places great emphasis on “people‟s time” and implies that not being 
expeditious is also a procedural failure. Of course, he does not consider that fact that 
the long process may also be procedural constraints to ensure that the case is 
resolved judiciously. He somewhat overstates this, but there can be no doubt that this 
criticism was very applicable to Iranians of the time, especially youngsters and the 
lower to middle classes. Not only in the judicial ministry but other public offices too, 
dealing with cold and aloof Persian bureaucrats, whether a western educated 
Muslim, detached Baha‟i or a simple white collar official, was certainly tedious and 
incoherent as they tend to be in dictatorships. 
 
Moreover, Khomeini (1981, 32) extends this notion further. He contends that the 
tedious process of legal and other public functions results in „cunning‟, „bribery‟ and 
corruption being the major way of ensuring cases are “settled expeditiously, but at 
the cost of justice (Khomeini 1981, 32-3).” He concludes this idea of corruption with 
a grand estimation however. He deduces that the implementation of Islamic penal 
codes is the only way to prevent society from being destroyed by corruption 
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Thus, here what Khomeini is saying is by adopting the Shariah, the administrative 
function of the state would be simplified, rather than tedious bureaucratic red-tape. 
The idea that the state could be an instrument that benefits the populace then remains 
part of the discourse. Yet Khomeini‟s conception of the rule of the jurist places the 
state firmly as an Islamic normative order. Whether the practice of this was borne 
out in reality is not under the purview of this essay. The Wilayat-e Faqih and 
Khomeini‟s broader conception of the Islamic state represented the culmination of 
over a century of modern Islamic political thought. From its early instrumentalist 
role and its capacity to revive Islam the state has become an object and extension of 
divinity itself. Its realm has become the realm of God and His sovereignty. One 
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has analysed the transformation of the state in modern Islamic 
political discourse. By not focusing on critiquing the direction that the Islamic state 
took in the literature, but rather tracing its substantive modification, this paper has 
attempted to provide a new theoretical lens to how we can view the conception of 
the modern Islamic state in the writings of its most prominent ideologues. The 
findings of this paper propose that the Islamic state reacted to its external 
environment as well as the legacies and theories of preceding generations of Muslim 
political ideologues. The state in modern Islamic political discourse can be 
periodised into three distinct phases. 
 
The first represented the age of revivalism where the state could be used as an 
instrument to revive Islam for Afghani. The state was still very much reliant on the 
dominant conception of the state as monopoliser of violence and administrative 
device. The state‟s function was to establish order and promote advancement to 
compete with the west. 
 
The second age represented the intermediate phase and followed the dissolution of 
the Ottoman Empire. Here, for Raziq, the state had nothing to do with Islam as 
politics had no spiritual value. For Rida on the other hand, the state could be 
instrumental in providing justice, as justice was the natural corollary of the 
magnanimous Shariah. The Shariah’s strength lay in its ability to deal with change. 












Page | 77 
The final phase marked the period that coincided with the failure and corruption of 
post-colonial states. In this period and in the writings of Mawdudi and Khomeini, the 
state became an extension of the divine because it represented God‟s sovereignty. 
The state possessed a spiritual value and had to ensure that God‟s law governed 
man‟s behaviour. The political became an act of religion and the state represented an 
Islamic normative order. 
 
In terms of structure, this paper firstly conceptualised the most important themes that 
guided our understanding of political Islam. Thereafter, it introduced the western 
conception of the state as instrumentalist against the state as normative order. The 
third section analysed the pioneering work on modern political Islam, the 
instrumentalist state and its focus on revivalism. The fourth section focused on the 
intermediate phase where modern political thought had reached a crossroad and from 
where the state was redirected toward a „normativising‟ state. The fifth and final 
section evaluated the turn toward fundamentalism and the increasing focus on a 
totalising Islamic normative order, whilst the analysis was still sensitive to the 
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